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Sammendrag 
Vi studerer husholdningenes spareatferd når usikkerheten rundt fremtiden på arbeidsplassen øker. I 
artikkelen ser vi nærmere på hvordan husholdninger reagerer på økt usikkerhet i egen inntekt. Vi 
bruker regnskapsdata fra bedriftene som arbeiderne jobber i. På den måten kan vi identifisere sjokk i 
driftsinntekten hos bedriften som ligger utenfor arbeidstakerens kontroll. Dette er viktig for en kausal 
tolkning av resultatene. Når usikkerheten øker reduserer arbeiderne sin beholdning av aksjer i egen 
finansportefølje, og øker tilsvarende sin beholdning av midler i banken.  
1 Introduction
How important is background labor income risk for individuals’ portfolio allocations? To properly
answer this question we assemble a rich administrative household data set from Norway that allows
us to overcome the identiﬁcation challenges that plague most of the empirical work on the subject.
The topic of background risk - a risk that cannot be avoided or insured - has a long history
in macroeconomics and ﬁnance. Starting with Aiyagari (1994), a large literature has studied
how the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk in an incomplete market setting
aﬀects the patterns of individual and aggregate savings, consumption and portfolio allocations over
the life cycle, as well as the behavior of asset prices. The theory argues that under plausible
preference restrictions consumers who face uninsurable labor income risk respond by accumulating
precautionary savings, raising labor supply, or more generally changing the pattern of human
capital accumulation (e.g., Levhari and Weiss, 1974). Furthermore, people reduce exposure to risks
that they can avoid. In particular, they change the asset allocation of their ﬁnancial portfolio by
lowering the share invested in risky assets, thus tempering their overall risk exposure (Merton,
1971; Kimball, 1993; Constantinides and Duﬃe, 1996; Heaton and Lucas, 1996; Heaton and Lucas,
2000).
Motivated by these theoretical predictions and the undisputable importance for many households
of labor income, one strand of research has incorporated background risk in calibrated models of
(consumption and) portfolio allocation over the life cycle and explored its ability to help reproduce
patterns observed in the data (e.g. Viceira, 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005; Heaton and
Lucas, 2000; Polkovnichenko, 2007). Another strand has tried to assess the empirical relevance
of uninsurable income risk in explaining portfolio heterogeneity. A fair characterization of both
strands of literature is that the eﬀect of background labor income risk on portfolio allocation,
though carrying the sign that theory predicts, is relatively small in size. As a consequence, the
background risk channel seems to have lost appeal as a quantitatively important determinant of
household portfolio choices or as a candidate explanation for asset pricing puzzles (such as the
equity premium puzzle, see e.g. Cochrane, 2006).
In this paper we reconsider the role of background labor income risk for people’s willingness
to bear ﬁnancial risk and question the conventional wisdom of the empirical literature. We argue
that the empirical literature suﬀers from identiﬁcation problems that also aﬀect calibrated models
of life cycle savings and portfolio allocation. Identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of uninsurable income risk
is arduous and its quantiﬁcation problematic.
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Identiﬁcation is arduous for at least three reasons. First, in order to identify the marginal
eﬀect of uninsurable risk in returns to human capital one needs exogenous variation in background
risk. A popular solution (e.g. Heaton and Lucas, 2000; Angerer, Xiaohong and Pok-Sang Lam,
2009; Betermier et al., 2011; Palia et al., 2014) is to measure background risk with the variance
of (residual) log earnings or log income typically obtained from households survey data (e.g., the
PSID in the US). Another is to use second moments from subjective expectations of future incomes
(e.g. Guiso et al., 1996; Hochguertel, 2003) or health status (which may be particularly relevant
for the elderly, Edwards, 2008). Yet, as a recent literature suggests, most of the variation in
earnings is predictable and a reﬂection of choice (e.g. Heckman et al., 2005; Primiceri and van
Rens, 2009; Low, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010; Guvenen and Smith, 2014); on the other hand, there
are long-standing reservations regarding the validity and content of subjective expectations data,
as well as important practical data problems: subjective expectations data are rarely available
alongside longitudinal data on assets, making it hard to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. In
sum, isolating background risk is far from trivial. The empirical measures described above introduce
a sort of errors-in-variable problem that biases towards zero the estimated eﬀect of labor income
risk on portfolio choice. Furthermore, as we shall discuss, the size of the downward bias can be
substantial.
Second, notwithstanding the problem of obtaining a conceptually sound measure of background
risk, other econometric issues may make estimates of its eﬀect on portfolio (or other ﬁnancial)
choice unreliable. For example, most of the evidence on the eﬀect of income risk comes from cross
sectional data, inducing unobserved heterogeneity bias (e.g., unobserved risk aversion determines
both income risk through occupational choice as well as the composition of one’s asset portfolio).
Dealing with unobserved heterogeneity is diﬃcult, as one requires panel data with variation over
time in background risk, which is rare.1
1Betermier et al. (2011) is one exception. They deal with unobserved heterogeneity by looking at people who
change industry and exploiting diﬀerences in income volatility across industries. They ﬁnd that people who move
from low to high volatility industries reduce exposure to stocks signiﬁcantly and interpret the ﬁnding as consistent
with hedging. While this marks progress, movers solve one issue but raise another: moving is endogenous and it
is conceivable that the same factors that trigger moving also aﬀect portfolio rebalancing. While the authors show
evidence that movers and stayers share similar observable characteristics, selection on unobservables (such as risk
preferences) may be driving mobility. In addition, the measure of earnings volatility they use – the industry mean
of the volatility of net earnings – reﬂects both components that qualify as background risk and others that do not,
as well as heterogeneity across industries. This makes it hard to estimate the economic eﬀect of earnings risk on
portfolio choice.
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A ﬁnal issue is that most of the empirical literature uses survey data on assets. These are
notoriously subject to measurement error and rarely sample the upper tail of the distribution
(which is key, given the enormous skewness in the distribution of wealth). Moreover, both in
survey and administrative data there is non-negligible censoring of stockholding because several
investors choose to stay out of the stock market.
In this paper we develop an identiﬁcation strategy that overcomes these problems and obtain
appropriate data to implement it. First, we rely on idiosyncratic and unpredictable variation in
the performance of the ﬁrm a person works for and on a clear identiﬁcation of the pass-through of
ﬁrm shocks to the worker’s wages in order to isolate one component of labor income that qualiﬁes
as background risk - i.e., one that cannot be avoided or insured. This is the component of the wage
that ﬂuctuates with idiosyncratic variation in ﬁrm performance, reﬂecting partial wage insurance
within the ﬁrm. We show that this component can be used as an instrument for total residual labor
income variation which allows to deal with the measurement error in background risk. Because this
component varies over time, the availability of long panel data on ﬁrms and their workers makes it
possible to deal with unobserved heterogeneity, thus circumventing the second obstacle to achieve
identiﬁcation.
We implement these ideas using administrative data for the whole population of Norway. Be-
cause Norway levies a tax on wealth, each year Norwegian taxpayers must report their assets, item
by item, to the tax authority. The data are available for a long time span and cover the entire
population, including those in the very top tail of the wealth distribution. These data allow us
to compute ﬁnancial portfolio shares at the household level. In addition we can merge the wealth
data with matched employer/employees data from the social security archives. The latter contain
information on workers’ employment spells and earnings in each job, as well as measures of ﬁrm
performance, mass layoﬀs, and closures due to ﬁrm bankruptcy. Armed with these data we mea-
sure how workers’ earnings respond to permanent and transitory shocks to the performance of the
ﬁrm. Since the pass-through is non-zero (i.e., there is only partial insurance), we use measures of
ﬁrm volatility to instrument workers’ earnings variability when estimating the households portfolio
shares in risky assets. In addition, we complement the earnings variability measure of background
risk with a measure of exposure to the risk of ﬁrm closure, providing exogenous variation in the
risk of job loss, which allows us to study the portfolio response to idiosyncratic tail background
risk.
We document a number of important ﬁndings. First, ignoring the endogeneity of wage variability
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but accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, we reproduce the small marginal eﬀect of background
labor income risk on the portfolio allocation to risky assets that characterizes the empirical lit-
erature. However, when we instrument earnings variability with the ﬁrm-variation component of
background risk, we ﬁnd that the marginal eﬀect is an order of magnitude larger. This suggests
a large downward bias in prevailing estimates of the eﬀect of background risk and, in principle, a
potentially more important role for human capital risk in explaining portfolio decisions and assets
pricing. In contrast, we ﬁnd very small eﬀects of employment loss risk, possibly because this type
of risk is insured through generous social insurance programs in Norway.
As noticed above, empirical estimates of the eﬀect of background risk on portfolio allocations
face also a problem of censoring (a large fraction of investors hold no risky assets in their portfolio).
Simultaneously accounting for censoring, ﬁxed unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity due to
measurement error is computationally unfeasible. The very few estimators that have been proposed
in the literature are based on very strong assumptions that are unlikely to hold in our speciﬁc
application. Nevertheless, assuming the various biases due to unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity
of wage variance and censoring are (approximately) linear, we can gauge their sizes and obtain
a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the marginal eﬀect of background wage risk on the ﬁnancial
portfolio. When we do this we still ﬁnd an estimate that is an order on magnitude larger than
the OLS (ﬁxed eﬀect) estimate, implying that the key force biasing the eﬀect of background risk is
measurement error (i.e., the assumption that all residual wage variability is risk).
Second, we ﬁnd that marginal eﬀects of background risk vary considerably across individuals
depending on their level of wealth. The portfolio response of individuals at the bottom of the
wealth distribution - those with little buﬀers to face labor income uncertainty - is twice as large
as that of the workers with median wealth; the eﬀect gets smaller as wealth increases and drops
to zero at the top of the wealth distribution. Background risk is irrelevant for those with large
amounts of assets despite the fact that their compensation is more sensitive (as we document) to
ﬁrms shocks.
Third, using the estimated parameters we provide some bounds on the eﬀects of background risk
when the latter is caused by a reductions in the amount of wage insurance provided by ﬁrms and
in the predictability of workers’ wage shocks. Evaluated at the means of the portfolio sensitivity
and of ﬁrms insurance and wage predictability, the eﬀect of background risk is small: individuals
with the average amount of background risk have a share of risky assets in portfolio that is 1/4 of a
percentage point smaller than those with no background risk whatsoever. These numbers suggest
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that, when quantifying the eﬀect of background risk on portfolio choice, our conclusions are not
diﬀerent from what found in the existing literature - despite the larger sensitivity to risk that we
estimate. The key to understanding this apparently puzzling result is that the eﬀect of risk on
portfolio choice depends on two things: the response of portfolio choice to a change in the risk and
the size of the risk itself. Our estimates suggest that the true marginal response is much larger and
the true background risk much smaller than typically found. In the existing literature the opposite
is true: estimated risk is overstated and (because of this) the sensitivity is downward biased, thus
reaching the right conclusion but for the wrong reasons. In turn, we show that wage ﬂuctuations
risk is contained because ﬁrms provide workers with substantial insurance. If ﬁrms were to share
shocks equally with their workers, the latter would reduce the demand for risky ﬁnancial assets
substantially, particularly for low wealth workers. In sum, the economic importance of human
capital risk crucially hinges on the insurance role of the ﬁrm and the amount of assets available to
the individual to buﬀer labor income shocks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature and high-
lights our contribution. In Section 3 we illustrate the econometric problems that arise when trying
to identify the eﬀect of background risk on ﬁnancial decisions, and show how we tackle them.
Section 4 describes the data sources. Section 5 discusses the construction of our measures of back-
ground risk. Section 6 turns to the estimates of the marginal eﬀect of background risk on people’s
portfolio allocation, presents several robustness tests and allows for wealth-driven heterogeneity in
the portfolio response to background risk. We discuss the economic eﬀect of background risk on
the demand for risky ﬁnancial assets in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Several papers provide evidence that labor income risk has a tempering eﬀect on households
portfolio allocation. In one of the ﬁrst studies on the topic, Guiso et al. (1996) use a measure of
earnings risk obtained from the subjective distribution of future labor income in a sample of Italian
workers and ﬁnd that households with more spread-out beliefs of future income invest a lower share
in risky assets. However, the economic eﬀect is small: households with above average subjective
earnings variance invest a 2 percentage points lower share of their wealth in stocks than households
with below average uncertainty. Because they use cross sectional data, unobserved heterogeneity
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cannot be controlled for.2 Hochguertel (2003) also relies on a self-assessed subjective measure of
earnings risk available for Dutch households. The data are longitudinal, allowing him to control for
unobserved heterogeneity. However, the results are similar: a negative, small eﬀect of subjective
wage income risk on the share of risky assets.
One advantage of subjective expectations is that in principle they reﬂect all the information
available to the household; one issue, however, is that elicitation can be problematic as household
may have diﬃculties understanding the survey question. This may result in classical measurement
error as well as in households mis-reporting the probability of very low income states. Both facts
are consistent with the low estimated variances of income growth compared to those obtained from
panel data estimates of labor income processes. Accordingly, several papers have measured labor
income risk using panel data models of workers’ earnings.
Heaton and Lucas (2000) use income data from tax records of a sample of US workers to measure
wage income and proprietary income variability and correlate them with stock portfolio shares.
They ﬁnd a negative, but small and statistically insigniﬁcant, eﬀect of wage income variability and
a negative, statistically signiﬁcant but still small eﬀect of proprietary income variability on the
demand for stocks. Unfortunately, inference is impaired both because portfolio data are imputed
as well as because measured background risk - the unconditional standard deviation of wage income
and proprietary income growth - may contain a large portion that reﬂects choice rather that risk. In
addition, unobserved heterogeneity, particularly in the case of proprietary income, may be driving
the results.
Angerer et al. (2009) overcome some of these problems. They use the US National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth to estimate the residual variance of labor income growth, after conditioning on a
number of observables. Thus, their measure of background risk reduces the weight of the predicable
component and in addition they distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks to labor
income. Perhaps because of this, compared to the previous papers they ﬁnd somewhat larger
eﬀects, particularly in response to the variance of permanent shocks to labor income. Overall, a
10% increase in the standard deviation of labor income shocks lowers the portfolio stock share by 3.3
percentage points. More recently, Palia et al. (2014) have extended the analysis to consider several
sources of background risk, including labor income, returns on housing, and entrepreneurial income.
They estimate that one standard deviation increase in labor income risk lowers the share in stocks
2Also using cross sectional data, Arrondel and Calvo-Pardo (2012) ﬁnd a positive correlation between subjective
income risk and the portfolio risky share of French households. They argue that the result can be explained by sample
selection of more risk tolerant workers into riskier occupations.
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by 1.8 percentage points and ﬁnd a larger eﬀect on participation (a reduction of 5.5 percentage
points). Needless to say, eﬀects are larger when all sources of background risk increase at once.
Yet, because they compute background risk as the standard deviation of the (unconditional) growth
rate of earnings, their background risk measure is likely overstated.
Overall, this summary of the literature suggests relatively contained eﬀects of background risk
on the demand for risky assets. Idiosyncratic labor income risk has therefore, been dismissed
as an important factor in explaining portfolio allocation heterogeneity and assets prices (Heaton
and Lucas, 2008; Cochrane, 2006). Yet, the likely presence of (potentially severe) measurement
error in background risk raises some doubts about this conclusion and thus on the assets prices
implications. In the next section we set up an econometric framework and argue that empirical
measures of background risk such as those used in the literature so far are very likely to generate
substantial downward biases in the marginal eﬀect of labor income risk (and other sources of
background risk). We also suggests a methodology to obtain a well-deﬁned measure of background
risk and a consistent estimate of its marginal causal eﬀect.
3 Econometric Framework
Consider the following empirical model for the portfolio share in risky assets:
Sit = W′itβ + λBit + ri + εit (1)
where Sit is the share of risky assets in individual i’s ﬁnancial portfolio at time t, Wit are socio-
demographic characteristics related to portfolio choice (such as gender, education, total wealth,
etc.), Bit a measure of background risk, ri an unobserved individual ﬁxed eﬀect (which may capture
heterogeneity in risk tolerance or ﬁnancial literacy), and εit an error term. The empirical literature
has used variants of the above model, coupled with some strategy to measure background risk. Suc-
cess in identifying the parameter λ rides on the ability to account for the unobserved heterogeneity
ri and, as we show below, on the properties of measured background risk.
A general empirical strategy for measuring background risk in returns to human capital consists
of writing a labor earnings process such as:
ln yijt = Z′itγ + vit + θffjt
where yijt are earnings earned by worker i in ﬁrm j at time t, Zit is a vector of observable wage
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determinants, vit a component of worker’s earnings volatility that is partly under the control of the
agent and unrelated to the fortunes of the ﬁrm (e.g., unobserved changes in general human capital),
and fjt a ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock. The econometrician does not observe the degree of the agent’s control
over vit. We assume that the error components fjt and vit are mutually uncorrelated. Firm shocks
are passed onto wages with pass-through coeﬃcient θf . We can decompose the evolution of wages
into two components - one that is avoidable or evolves in an anticipated manner, and one that is
unavoidable or evolves in an unanticipated way (shocks). Hence:
ln yijt = Z′itγ + (1− θv) vit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Anticipated/Avoidable
+ θvvit + θffjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unanticipated/Unavoidable
= Ait + Uit
The separation of vit in a component that is anticipated/avoidable and one that is not (with
weight θv) comes from recognizing that part of what the econometrician identiﬁes as “background
risk” can be variability in earnings that reﬂects, at least in part, individual choices rather than
risk. For instance, time out of the labor market does not necessarily reﬂect unemployment risk, but
could be time invested in human capital accumulation. Some volatility can be generated by people
working longer hours in response to adverse ﬁnancial market shocks aﬀecting the value of their
portfolio. A recent literature suggests that a non-negligible fraction of year-to-year ﬂuctuations in
labor earnings reﬂect heterogeneity or choice, rather than risk (see Heckman et al., 2005; Primiceri
and van Rens, 2009; Low, Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010; and Guvenen and Smith, 2014).
In keeping with this discussion, the ”true” measure of background risk should be:
Bit = var (Uit)
= θ2vvar (vit) + θ
2
fvar (fjt)
= ρvVit + ρfFit (2)
where V and F are the worker-related and ﬁrm-related background risk variance components.
Unfortunately, this is not what is typically used in the empirical literature. First, since in survey
data wages are measured with error ξit, the observed wage is:
ln y∗ijt = ln yijt + ξijt
Second, the measure of background risk that is typically used is σ2it = var
(
ln y∗ijt − Z′itγ
)
=
Vit + ρfFit + σ2ξ = Bit + ϕit, where ϕit = (1− ρv)Vit + σ2ξ . This diﬀers from the true one because
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it includes the variance of the measurement error and because it assumes that the volatility of the
worker component vit is all unavoidable risk, while in fact a fraction (1 − ρv) of it reﬂects choice.
An OLS regression of Sit on the measure σ2it (omitting individual ﬁxed eﬀects, ri) gives incon-
sistent estimates of the sensitivity of portfolio choice to background risk.3 Indeed:
p lim λ̂OLS = λ
ρvvar (Vit) + ρ2fvar (Fit)
var (Vit) + ρ2fvar (Fit) + var
(
σ2ξ
) + cov
(
ri, Vit + ρfFit
)
var (Vit) + ρ2fvar (Fit) + var
(
σ2ξ
)
The ﬁrst term resembles a measurement error bias: background risk is mis-measured both be-
cause all variability in vit is interpreted as risk, and because there is unaccounted noise that agents
don’t act upon. On the other hand, if higher risk tolerance is the only element of unobserved het-
erogeneity and it is associated to both less conservative portfolios and a more volatile wage process,
then the second term is positive and may well counterbalance the ”measurement error/conceptual
risk” bias. Consider for example using occupation dummies to measure background risk. Empiri-
cally, the self-employed have greater year-to-year wage volatility, while public employees face lower
wage and employment risk. If allocation to occupations were random, theory would predict that
the high risk types should hold more conservative portfolios than the low risk types. But this is
not what is typically found in the data. The self-employed invest more in stocks and have greater
income volatility (see, e.g., Georgarakos and Inderst, 2014). The “puzzle” can be explained by the
fact that there is sorting into occupations based on attitudes towards risk which confounds the
impact of background risk on portfolio choice because more risk averse individuals choose both low
risk occupations and more conservative portfolios.
In panel data one can control for individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Hence, the second bias term disappears
and the sensitivity of portfolio choice to risk is downward biased, i.e.:
p lim λ̂FE = λ
ρvvar (Vit) + ρ2fvar (Fit)
var (Vit) + ρ2fvar (Fit) + var
(
σ2ξ
) (3)
The extent of the downward bias can be substantial. Even ignoring measurement error in
earnings (i.e. setting σ2ξ = 0), if ﬁrms oﬀer substantial wage insurance (i.e., the term ρf is ”small”)
and if a relevant share of workers related variation in earnings is due to choice rather than to risk
(i.e., ρv is small), then the OLS estimate of the eﬀect of background risk can be much lower than
the true eﬀect.
3Conditional onWit.
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Both conditions are likely to hold in practice. As documented by Guiso et al. (2005) using
Italian data, ﬁrms oﬀer partial but substantial wage insurance, implying a value of ρf much smaller
than 1 and close to 0.01 (since their estimate of θf is 0.1). In Section 5 we show that this result
holds also in our Norwegian data. On the other hand, there is evidence that a lot of variation
in individual earnings is predictable. For instance, Cunha and Heckman (2007) estimate that for
US skilled workers only 8% of the increase in wage variability is due to increased uncertainty and
92% to heterogeneity. Using Italian subjective earnings expectations data (which incorporate more
information than that typically available to the econometrician), Kaufman and Pistaferri (2009)
calculate that only about 1/4 of the residual earnings growth variance is risk, while the remainder
is predictable or noise.
We take these concerns seriously and recognize that the very notion of “background” risk requires
that it is exogenous and that agents have little control over it. We use ﬁrm-derived measures of wage
(and employment) risk to isolate one exogenous component of the variance of individual returns to
human capital and use this as an instrument for the total variance of (residual) earnings σ2it. In
the above framework, this boils down to using Fit as an instrument for σ2it (while controlling for
ﬁxed eﬀects in the risky asset share equation).
To illustrate this strategy, suppose we have data on ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks such that we can obtain
an estimate of Fit. The latter qualiﬁes as an instruments for the error-ridden measure of background
risk σ2it. First, under the assumption that the ﬁrm only oﬀers partial wage insurance to the workers
(an assumption supported by the evidence in Section 5), Fit has predictive power for σ2it; second,
once occupational sorting is neutralized by controlling for individual ﬁxed eﬀects, Fit is orthogonal
to the residual in the portfolio allocation decision as it only reﬂects variability in the productivity
of the ﬁrm. It is easy to show that this strategy identiﬁes the eﬀect of background risk on portfolio
choice as:4
p lim λ̂IV FE = p lim
cov (Sit, Fit)
cov
(
σ2it, Fit
)
= p lim
cov
(
λ
(
ρvVit + ρfFit
)
+ ri + εit, Fit
)
cov
(
Vit + ρfFit + σ2ξ , Fit
)
= λ (4)
4Note that a simple cross-sectional IV estimator (which ignores ﬁxed eﬀects) will still be inconsistent, as p lim ̂λIV =
λ + p lim cov(ri,Fit)
cov(σ2it,Fit)
.
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It is important to notice that the reduced form estimate of ﬁrm volatility onto the share of risky
assets does not identify the sensitivity of the portfolio allocation to background to risk, but instead:
p lim λ̂RFFE = p lim
cov (Sit, Fit)
var (Fit)
= p lim
cov
(
λ
(
ρvVit + ρfFit
)
+ ri + εit, Fit
)
var (Fit)
= λρf ≤ λ
as ﬁrm shocks pass through only partially to wages. Furthermore, the diﬀerence between the true
sensitivity λ and the reduced form response λρf can be very large if ﬁrms provide substantial wage
insurance, i.e., ρf is ”small”. We stress this case because Hung et al. (2014) propose precisely
this type of exercise, assigning to individual investors the stock market volatility of the ﬁrm they
work for as a measure of background income risk and estimating the portfolio response to this
measure. This strategy, while similar in spirit to ours, ignores that the ﬁrm component enters with
a pass-through coeﬃcient ρf < 1. To be able to identify λ from the reduced form estimate one
needs also to separately identify ρf . This point is missed by Hung et al. (2014), and their strategy
would only deliver consistent estimates of λ if the worker ”owned the ﬁrm” - i.e. in the absence of
wage insurance. On the other hand, papers that use survey data sets such as the SCF or PSID to
estimate the eﬀect of background risk on portfolio choices, cannot identify its eﬀect as they lack
matched employer-employee data to estimate Fit and ρf.
The last issue we need to address is the fact that the dependent variable is censored: a non-
negligible fraction of households have no risky assets in their ﬁnancial portfolio. One way to handle
this issue is to assume that equation (1) represents the latent demand for risky assets, but what is
observed is a censored version of it:
Scit = Sit × 1 {Sit ≥ 0}
Using a ﬁxed eﬀect-IV estimator in cases in which the dependent variable is censored implies
that (??) no longer provides a consistent estimator. In principle, one could apply an estimator that
deals with all three problems at once (ﬁxed eﬀects, endogenous regressors, and censoring of the
dependent variable), such as the extension of the standard Tobit estimator considered by Honore`
and Hu (2004). In practice, this estimator does not work well in our administrative large-scale data
set. We will instead consider some back-of-the-envelope exercises that compare various estimators
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proposed in the literature to get some knowledge about the true value of the parameter of interest
λ.
In general, the data requirement for identifying the eﬀect of background income risk are quite
formidable. Matched employee-employer data are needed to obtain a proper measure of (at least one
component of) background risk; to account for individual ﬁxed eﬀects the data need to have a panel
dimension, and the panel needs to be long enough to generate variation over time in background risk.
Finally, inference on portfolio decisions is greatly facilitated if assets are measured without error, a
requirement that is rarely met in households surveys because measured incomes and ﬁnancial assets
are plagued with reporting error, under-reporting and non-reporting (e.g. Hurst, Li and Pugsley,
2015).
In the empirical analysis we use administrative data on wages and ﬁnancial assets, where mea-
surement error is virtually absent. These data are available for over 15 years and we can identify
the employer: hence we are able to construct a measure of Fit that is individual-and time-varying.
Because the data is a panel we can control for ﬁxed eﬀects and thus purge the estimates from un-
observed heterogeneity correlated with measures of background risk while simultaneously driving
portfolio choice (e.g. risk tolerance). In this sense, since we are able to simultaneously account for
all the issues that plague existing empirical studies, we are giving the background risk model the
best possible chance to succeed.
4 Data and Norwegian institutional insurance provisions
4.1 Data
To study whether households shelter against (unavoidable) labor income risk by changing their
risky ﬁnancial portfolio, we employ high-quality data from Norway consisting of eight separate
databases. All of our data are collected for administrative purposes, which essentially eliminates
concerns about measurement error. The data sets can be linked through unique identiﬁers assigned
to each individual and ﬁrm in Norway (similar to SSN’s and EIN’s for the US, respectively). Here
we provide a broad description of these data sets, which unless otherwise speciﬁed cover the time
period 1995-2010; Appendix A1 illustrates the features of the data in greater detail.
The Central Population Register contains basic end-of-year demographic information (i.e.,
gender, birth date, county of residence, and marital status) on all registered Norwegian residents.
Importantly, it contains family identiﬁers allowing us to match spouses and cohabiting couples who
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have a common child. We merge this data set with information on educational attainment (from
the National Educational Database) and information on end-of-year ﬁnancial assets from tax
records (Administrative Tax and Income Register).
To comply with the wealth tax, each year Norwegians must report to the tax authority the
value of all real and ﬁnancial assets holdings as of the end of the previous calendar year. Data
on traded ﬁnancial assets, for a broad spectrum of assets categories, are reported (at their market
value) directly by the ﬁnancial institution that has the assets in custody (e.g., a mutual fund or a
deposit bank). This has two main advantages: ﬁrst, given the administrative nature of the data,
ﬁnancial assets are measured with virtually no error; second, because they are reported by a third
party, the scope for tax evasion is absent. For stocks of non-listed and non-traded companies, asset
valuation is based on annual reports submitted to the tax authority by the companies themselves.
If the tax authority ﬁnds the proposed evaluation unrealistically low, it can start a formal audit
process, which limits the scope for undervaluation.
Besides the asset values data set, we have also access to the Register of Shareholders for
the period 2004 to 2010. This register reports, on an individual basis, the number and value of
individual stockholdings, together with the ID of the ﬁrm that issues the stock. This allows us to
account for direct stockholding in the company where the worker is employed, a feature that turns
out to be useful when we discuss various robustness checks (Section 5.1).
Because we focus on the household as our decision unit, we aggregate assets holdings at the
level of the family by summing up asset values across family members using the unique household
ID described above.5 We then classify ﬁnancial assets holdings into ”risky assets” (R) - the sum of
directly held stocks in listed and non-listed companies and mutual funds with a stock component
- and ”risk-free assets” (RF ) - the diﬀerence between total ﬁnancial assets and risky assets, which
includes bank deposits, government bonds and money market funds - and deﬁne the portfolio risky
assets share for each households Sit = RitRit+RFit . Because of limited stock market participation, Sit =
0 for non-participants, giving rise to censoring in our left-hand side variable.6 In the population
(before any sample selection), participation in the risky assets market increases substantially in the
1995-2010 period (see Figure 1). During the same time period the the average portfolio share in
5In Norway married couples are taxed jointly when it comes to wealth tax, but individually for income tax
purposes.
6In the original data, there are households holding extremely small amounts in stock accounts, due presumably
to dormant accounts. We assume that genuine stock market participants have at least the equivalent of $30 worth of
risky assets in their portfolio. Imposing smaller or slightly larger thresholds has no eﬀects on the results.
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risky assets also increases (the dashed line in Figure 1).
Consistent with what found in the literature (Guiso and Sodini, 2013), there is substantial
cross sectional variation in the conditional risky share. As Figure 2 shows, its distribution spans
the entire [0-1] range – from people holding very small amounts to people investing their entire
ﬁnancial portfolio in stocks. In this paper we ask how much of this heterogeneity can be explained
by background risk, if any.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the portfolio data and the ﬁnancial wealth of our Norwegian
sample. Since we select younger households with the primary earner working in the private sector
(see below), their average stock market participation is higher than in the whole population (55
percent); conditional on participation, the average Norwegian household in our sample invests about
38% of its portfolio in risky assets.
The Employer-Employee Register links workers to ﬁrms; for each worker it reports all
employment spells with each employer, and the compensation received. This allows us to trace the
working history of each worker as she moves across ﬁrms and occupational status.
We combine the Employer-Employee Register with the Central Register of Establishments
and Enterprises and the Balance Sheet Register with the unique ﬁrm ID present in all of
these data sets. The former contains information on industry classiﬁcation and institutional sector,
whereas the other contains accounting data on the ﬁrm’s assets, liabilities and income statement.
Among other items, it includes data on the ﬁrm’s value added and sales that we use to construct
(statistically) shocks to the ﬁrm proﬁtability.
Lastly, on the ﬁrm side the Register of Bankruptcies contains information on the date a ﬁrm
enters a bankruptcy proceeding (if any) and is declared insolvent. We use this data set to identify
episodes of ﬁrm closure and enrich the measure of background risk based on the variance of workers
earnings with a measure of employment risk. In fact, the total variance of income comes partly
from (high frequency) wage variability conditional on working, and partly from (low frequency)
income variability conditional on losing the job.
Combining these three ﬁrm level data sets with the Employer-Employee Register allows us to
assign each worker in the sample the variability of the ﬁrm he/she works for (which depends on the
pass-through coeﬃcient estimated in Section 5), and to obtain a measure of background risk that
is theoretically more appropriate. Similarly, we can assign each worker the risk of involuntary job
loss at that ﬁrm. Because our measure of background risk depends on shocks to the ﬁrm that are
in some degree passed over to workers, we focus on a sample of individuals who are continuously
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employed in the private sector (30% of the workers are employed in the public sector in Norway).7
This excludes those who are not working (unemployed, retired, disabled, etc.) and those who have
a spell in the government sector. We also exclude individuals who are younger than 25 (and hence
possibly still in college) and those older than 60 (who may have intermittent participation and
widespread access to early retirement, Vestad 2014). After these exclusions and a few others due
to missing data at the ﬁrm level, we are left with a ﬁnal sample of 4,846,766 observations. The
number of observations in the various regressions we run are less than this because we use lags for
constructing some of the variables and instruments. Appendix A2 describes the sample selection
in greater detail.
4.2 Employment and wage insurance in Norway
Portfolio (and savings) responses to wage ﬂuctuations and risk of job loss clearly depend on how
much insurance Norwegian workers can access through the welfare state. For example, no matter
how large the volatility of wages, portfolio choice would be independent of it if background risk
were fully insured.
Here we provide a broad description of social insurance programs in Norway, which are indeed
relatively generous by international standards. First, workers enjoy generous unemployment insur-
ance (UI). For permanent layoﬀs UI lasts for 52-104 weeks and replaces, on average, 62% of the
gross income in the last occupation. For temporary layoﬀs, UI is limited to 26 weeks within a 1.5
year period since layoﬀ. Norway oﬀers also disability insurance, which is obtained when the as-
sessed loss in earnings capacity is of at least 50%. Unlike the US, eligibility is means-tested (based
on income and assets). Finally, individuals may have access to sickness and maternity beneﬁts and
active labor market programs to revamp their skills in case of displacement.
While Norwegian workers are better shielded than, say, US workers against extreme low real-
izations of their human capital (i.e., their consumption ﬂoor is higher), they do face substantial
uninsured risk. First, government insurance oﬀers large protection against unemployment risk but
is fairly limited against the risk of wage ﬂuctuations conditional on employment – especially those
induced by ﬁrm-related shocks. There is indeed no insurance against wage cuts or not receiving
bonuses, but there is against being laid oﬀ. While severe wage ﬂuctuations induced by, say, work
limitations are insured through the disability insurance system, the means-tested aspect of the pro-
7If there are multiple earners in the household (and both work in the private sector) we measure background risk
with the one faced by the primary earner.
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gram reduces the scope of insurance, in particular due to the relative low risk of a disability and the
fungibility of savings (for example due to retirement or bequest motives). Second, unemployment
insurance is time limited, and remaining unemployed is economically costly due to scarring eﬀects
(Nielsen and Reiso, 2011). Indeed, despite the institutional diﬀerences, in the 2001-2013 period
average duration of unemployment in Norway was only 15% longer than in the US for people aged
25-54.8
5 Measuring Background Risk
In this and following sections we discuss our empirical ﬁndings. We start by motivating economically
our instruments. Next, we estimate the marginal eﬀect of background risk on portfolio allocation.
Finally, we assess the robustness of our ﬁndings.
To construct a measure of labor income risk that can be arguably considered as unavoidable, we
focus on shocks to ﬁrm proﬁtability, which may induce variation in workers’ pay (conditional on
retaining the job) or even involuntary job loss in more extreme cases. This strategy requires that:
a) we measure ﬁrm-related shocks; and b) we identify how much of these shocks are passed onto
the worker’s wages.
In principle, our instrument would be economically irrelevant if labor markets were frictionless
and workers could move rapidly and without cost between ﬁrms. A frictionless labor market would,
eﬀectively, provide them with full insurance against ﬁrm idiosyncratic shocks. The fact that ﬁrm
shocks are passed onto wages (as we document below) is of course prima facie evidence against
this possibility.
Needless to say, the possibility that ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks are passed onto workers’ earnings re-
quires that wages are at least partly determined at the ﬁrm level. This in turn depends on the
structure of wage bargaining. In Norway, like in other Nordic countries, union density and coverage
are high. However, in the private sector the coverage of collective bargaining agreements is actu-
ally “only” 55%, leaving ample room for many workers to have wages set outside the conventional
framework. Even for workers whose wages are negotiated centrally, there is still ample room for
local negotiation (or wage drift). Moreover, for white collars, collective bargaining only determines
the procedures for setting wages, while the actual level of wages is negotiated on an individual
basis. Finally, as reported by Loken and Stokke (2009), the share of private sector employees with
8See OECD statistics at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=AVD DUR.
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a component of pay that is variable (and most likely related to the ﬁrm performance) has increased
considerably from 10% in 1990 to 40% in 2005.
5.1 Earnings uncertainty: ﬁrm shocks and pass-through
Following Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005), we measure ﬁrm j performance with its value
added, V Ajt, and assume its log evolves according to the process
lnV Ajt = X′jtϕ+Qjt + f
T
jt
Qjt = Qjt−1 + fPjt
where Xjt is a vector of observables that captures the predictable component of ﬁrm’s performance.
The shock component is the residual Qjt + fTjt, the sum of a random walk component Qjt with
permanent shock fPjt and a transitory shock component f
T
jt.
Next, we model the earnings yijt (in logs) of worker i in ﬁrm j, in a similar vein, as a linear
function of a predictable component that depends on a vector of workers observed characteristics,
Zijt, an individual random walk and transitory component, and a component that depends on the
ﬁrm shocks with transmission coeﬃcients θT and θP , respectively for transitory and permanent
ﬁrm value added shocks.9 Hence:
ln yijt = Z′ijtγ+vijt + ηijt + θ
P fPjt + θ
T fTjt
vijt = Pijt + ηijt
Pijt = Pijt−1 + χijt
For ﬁrm-related background risk to matter, θT and θP must be positive and signiﬁcant. That
is, ﬁrms must pass over to the workers some of the shocks to their performance and not oﬀer
them full wage insurance. Using Italian data, Guiso et al. (2005) show that ﬁrms oﬀer partial wage
insurance to permanent and transitory shocks - that is the estimated values of θT and θP are positive
9These processes ﬁt the data quite well. The ﬁrst order autocovariances in the residual of the wage equation and
in the ﬁrms value added equation are negative, economically large and highly statistically signiﬁcant. The higher
order autocovariances decay very rapidly (the second order autocovariance is 10 times smaller than the ﬁrst order one
in both processes). Not surprising given the very large number of observations, they retain statistical signiﬁcance.
Economically, however, autocovariances past the second lag are minuscule.
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but smaller than one - and that the pass-through is larger for permanent shocks. Replicating their
methodology, their result has been shown to hold also in other countries, such as Portugal (Cardoso
and Portela, 2009), Germany (Guertzgen, 2010), Hungary (Katay, 2008), Sweden (Friedrich et al.,
2015), Belgium (Fuss and Wintr, 2008), France (Biscourp et al., 2005) and across US industries
(Lagakos and Ordonez, 2011) with remarkably similar patterns.
To establish the degree of pass-through of ﬁrm shocks to wages in Norway we use Guiso et al.
(2005)’s methodology. Deﬁne the unexplained growth of ﬁrm value added, gjt, and of workers’
earnings, ωijt as :
gjt = Δ(lnV Ajt −X′jtϕ)
ωijt = Δ(ln yijt − Z′ijtγ)
Guiso et al. (2005) show that the pass-through coeﬃcients θT and θP can be identiﬁed by simple
IV regressions:
θT =
cov(ωijt, gjt+1)
cov(gjt, gjt+1)
θP =
cov(ωijt, gjt−1 + gjt + gjt+1)
cov(gjt, gjt−1 + gjt + gjt+1)
Accordingly, we preliminarily run regressions for ﬁrm value added and workers’ wages. In the
ﬁrst we control for year dummies, area dummies, sectorial dummies, log ﬁrm size, and in the
second for year dummies, a quadratic in age, dummies for the quantity and type of schooling, ﬁrm
size, dummies for whether the individual experienced periods out of work due to sickness, maternity
leave, or unemployment, family size, area dummies, dummies for immigration status, and for family
type. We then retrieve the residuals from these regressions (the empirical analogs of gjt and ωijt
above), and estimate θT and θP . Results for the pass-through estimates are shown in Table 2.
Both parameters θT and θP are positive and estimated with great precision, implying that both
permanent and transitory shocks to the ﬁrm value added are passed onto wages. As in Guiso et
al. (2005), the wage response to permanent shocks to the ﬁrm performance (0.071) is signiﬁcantly
larger than the response to transitory shocks (0.018), which accords with intuition. The value of the
F -test suggests that the instruments used to identify the two parameters are quite powerful while
the Hansen J-test of the overidentifying restrictions reveals some misspeciﬁcation for θT , possibly
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arising from the fact that the i.i.d. assumption is a bit restrictive. Given that transitory shocks
play a small role, this is not worrying.
To have a reasonably long series of wage volatility measures, our strategy is to compute the
overall variance of unexplained workers earnings growth over T periods using rolling averages:
σ2it =
∑T−1
s=0 ω
2
ijt−s
T
We use this measure as explanatory variable when estimating the risky portfolio share but
instrument it with the variances of the unexplained ﬁrm value added growth - both permanent and
transitory - computed over the same T periods:
FPjt =
∑T−1
s=0 gjt−s(gjt−s−1 + gjt−s + gjt−s+1)
T
F Tjt =
∑T−1
s=0 gjt−sgjt−s+1
T
Notice that since the computation of these variances requires using lagged values of growth
rates, it can only be implemented if the panel has a long time dimensions, which is the case in our
data. We set T = 5 in what follows.10
5.2 Firm closure risk
Our second measure of background labor income risk is employment risk. This risk should also in
principle reﬂect idiosyncratic shocks to the (worker’s) ﬁrm so that it can vary across workers and
over time.11 We assume that the risk of ﬁrm bankruptcy captures the general ﬁrm distress climate.
In particular, we use the Registry of Firm Bankruptcies, which records the date in which the ﬁrm is
declared insolvent. We construct an indicator of ﬁrm closure risk if the worker is currently working
in a ﬁrm that will be declared bankrupt in t years. We experiment by changing the lead value t.
The bottom part of Table 1 reports summary statistics for the two measures of background risk
along with the estimated variances of the ﬁrms shocks. We ﬁnd that the average variance of earnings
growth in our sample is 0.05, with a standard deviation of 0.11; both ﬁgures are small compared to
those estimated from survey data (e.g. Gourinchas and Parker, 2002 and Cocco et al. 2005) partly
reﬂecting absence of measurement error in our measure of earnings. In contrast, the variance of
10The results are qualitatively similar if we use T = 3 or T = 4.
11Unemployment risk arising from macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in economic activity constitutes background risk
but, being common to all workers, is of little help in identifying the eﬀect of labor income risk on ﬁnancial decisions.
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ﬁrm value added growth is much larger (0.16), with an extremely large standard deviation of 0.49.
Finally, the risk of ﬁrm bankruptcy (the other measure of background risk we are going to use)
in 2010 is small (0.2%). However, the consequences of involuntary job loss associated with ﬁrm
destruction may be quite disastrous, at least for some workers, due to scarring eﬀects.12 Allowing
for job loss risk we can study the role of idiosyncratic tail background risk in households ﬁnancial
decisions whose importance for assets pricing has been recently stressed by Schmidt (2015).13
6 The Eﬀect of Background Risk on the Risky Portfolio Share
Armed with these measures, we test whether and by how much investors react to mitigate the
eﬀect of background risk in their human capital by reducing exposure to ﬁnancial risk - a risk
that they can avoid by rebalancing their ﬁnancial portfolio away from stocks or even exiting the
stock market altogether. We start with regressions of the portfolio share of risky ﬁnancial assets
against a set of socio-demographic characteristics of the household, our measures of background
risk, and households ﬁxed eﬀects to capture general heterogeneity in preferences for risk that can
be correlated with background risk. Of course, these ﬁxed eﬀects may also capture other sources
of unobservable heterogeneity that may impact households portfolio allocation - such as diﬀerences
in the precision of information about stock returns (Peress, 2004) or in ﬁnancial sophistication
(Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 2009).
We start the analysis by simple ﬁxed eﬀects regressions of the share of risky assets against
the variance of unexplained earnings growth - the measure that is typically used in the empirical
literature. For the time being, we also neglect the censoring issue, which we deal with in the next
section. Our empirical speciﬁcation includes a rich set of controls: a quadratic in age to model
life cycle portfolio eﬀects, year dummies which may capture passive variation in the asset share in
response to common changes in stock prices, and dummies for family type and area of residence.
To capture well-documented diﬀerences in assets allocation due partly to ﬁxed participation costs
in the stock market and ﬁnancial sophistication (Campbell, 2006), we control for lagged wealth. To
12Nilsen and Reiso (2010) study the long term unemployment consequences of displacement in Norway. They ﬁnd
that ﬁve years after job destruction, the likelihood of being unemployed is still 17.2% among the ”treated” group
and only 7.8% among the ”control” group. The negative eﬀect decreases over time, but there is some unemployment
”scarring” eﬀect remaining even 10 years after the initial shock.
13Calibrated life cycle portfolio models ﬁnd small eﬀects of uninsurable wage risk on the portfolio share in stocks
but larger eﬀects, particularly at young age, for the idiosyncratic risk of a job loss associated with a large wage cut
(Viceira, 2001; Cocco et al., 2005). However, this latter eﬀect is obtained ignoring unemployment insurance.
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account for interactions between levels of stockholding and housing (Cocco, 2004), we also control
for homeownership status. Finally, and importantly, we control for household ﬁxed eﬀects. Results
of these estimates are shown in column (1) of Table 3.
The estimated coeﬃcient on σ2it is consistent with the idea that workers who face unavoidable
human capital risk tend to take less ﬁnancial risk. The eﬀect of earnings risk is negative and very
precisely estimated. However, its size is small: one standard deviation increase in the (residual)
variance of log earnings would reduce the risky assets share by 0.12 percentage points. Because
the average risky assets share over the sample period is 21%, this amount to 0.6% of the average
sample share, too small an eﬀect to matter. Hence, these estimates replicate the small economic
eﬀect of background risk that has been found in the literature.
The second column shows results of the reduced form regression of the share where the reduced
form instruments are the ﬁrm permanent and transitory variance of ﬁrms value added, and ﬁnd
again negative coeﬃcients and much smaller responses. As argued in Section 2, this is consistent
with the estimated eﬀect of the variance of ﬁrm value added being the product of the true response
of the share to background earnings risk and the eﬀect of ﬁrms variability on the latter (typically
considerably smaller than 1, as shown in Table 2). Because of this, a regression of the share on the
variance of ﬁrm performance cannot identify the marginal eﬀect of background risk.
Estimates change considerably when we instrument total wage variance growth with the per-
manent and transitory variance of ﬁrm performance (Column 3). The coeﬃcient on the worker’s
earnings variance is negative and highly statistically signiﬁcant and its size (in absolute terms)
increases by a factor of 25 - from -0.02 to -0.5, resulting in a very high sensitivity of portfolio deci-
sions to background earnings risk. Of course, the economic importance of background risk depend
both on its marginal eﬀect as well as on the size of background risk. In Section 7 we discuss the
economic contribution of background risk in greater detail.
In all the speciﬁcations we have included also the risk of plant closure. We ﬁnd that this tail
measure of background risk discourages investment in risky assets, with eﬀects decaying as the
closure event is more distant into the future, which conforms with intuition. But the marginal
eﬀect is small.14 Increasing the risk of plant closure by a factor of 10 relatively to its mean would
14The fact that workers reduce stock exposure in anticipation of plant closure suggests that they correctly perceive
this risk. One may wonder whether the response we document is small because workers avoid the risk they face
by abandoning in advance the ”sinking ship” and smoothly relocating to another ﬁrm. To assess this possibility we
estimate a probit model for the event of job mobility as a function of current and future ﬁrm shocks and worker’s socio-
demographic characteristics (results available on request). We ﬁnd that future shocks to the ﬁrm growth and indicators
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reduce the share invested in risky assets by 0.07 percentage points, about 0.34% of the sample
mean share. A larger marginal eﬀect of wage risk than unemployment risk is consistent with the
fact that the ﬁrst source of variation is deﬁnitely uninsurable, while the second may be buﬀered
(and actually is) by unemployment insurance.
6.1 Dealing with censoring
The estimates in Table 3 address two of the issues that identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of background risk
poses - unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity problems that characterize the measures of
background risk used in the literature. The third problem, neglected so far, is that half of our sample
is censored from below at 0, i.e., there are on average about 45% stock market non-participants.
A formal treatment of censoring (e.g., through a Tobit approach) is unfeasible because we have
to deal simultaneously with three issues: endogeneity of the background risk measure, unobserved
heterogeneity in risk preferences which we capture with ﬁxed eﬀects, and censoring. Honore` and
Hu (2004) propose an estimator that deals with these three issues at once, but their estimator is
based on strong assumptions. For example, it requires that the endogenous variable is bounded
from above and below (which in our case, where the endogenous variable is a variance, clearly is
not).
Nevertheless, we can get a sense of the relative importance of the three issues for the estimates
of the eﬀect of background risk on the portfolio allocation by comparing ﬁve diﬀerent models: (1)
Linear regression with households ﬁxed eﬀects (FE); (2) IV linear regression with households ﬁxed
eﬀects (IVFE) (both of which we have already discussed in Table 3); (3) IV linear regression in
which we replace the ﬁxed eﬀects with a rich control function strategy that includes observable
ﬁxed heterogeneity (IVC); (4) IV Tobit regression with the same control function (IVTC); and (5)
a ”double control function” estimator (2IVTC), in which one assumes a linear relationship between
the ﬁxed eﬀect and the endogenous covariates, as in Chamberlain (1984).
If the three issues (endogeneity, ﬁxed eﬀects, censoring) are all important (and if the relationship
between the ﬁxed eﬀect and the endogenous covariates takes a more general form), none of these
models delivers consistent estimates. However, the bias of each of these models is diﬀerent and
for whether the ﬁrm goes bankrupt within 1-2 years have no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on mobility despite 3.2
million observations, implying that there is no support for the idea that ”rats leave the ship before it sinks”. The
fact that workers adjust their investments in stocks in response to plant closure but do not relocate is consistent with
the idea that mobility is costly to implement and that insurance through the labor market is hard to come by due to
frictions.
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can potentially be compared - as we do below - to gauge their relative importance and thus enable
us to say something about the true value of λ. The online appendix provides a discussion of the
diﬀerent biases.
We have already shown estimates for models (1) and (2) in Table 3 and reproduce the results
of (2) in the ﬁrst column of Table 4. In the second column we drop the ﬁxed eﬀects and replace
them with a rich control function that now includes the length and type of education plus the
gender of the household head (admittedly, very key determinants of risk tolerance or ﬁnancial
sophistication, see Guiso and Sodini, 2013). The estimate of λ drops (in absolute value) from −0.5
to −0.41 (which is consistent with the idea that omission of ﬁxed eﬀects generates an upward bias,
for example because more risk tolerant investors select jobs with higher ﬁrm volatility). Though
relatively large, this is not a dramatic drop from a qualitative point of view, an indication that the
upward bias from omitting ﬁxed eﬀects is likely contained (at least conditioning on the rich control
function). Column (3) shows estimates of a formal Tobit IV model with the same control function
as in column (2), which should eliminate the bias from neglecting censoring. The estimate of λ is
smaller but in the same ballpark, −0.32. The diﬀerence between IVTC and IVC can be interpreted
as the bias induced by censoring.15
In the ﬁnal column (4) we implement a ”double control function” estimator.16 In a ﬁrst step we
follow Blundell and Smith (1986), run a regression of our endogenous variable σ2it on the (included
and excluded) instruments and their means (to account for individual ﬁxed eﬀects in the wage
variances, as suggested by Chamberlain, 1984), and save the residuals, êit.17 In a second step, we
run a Tobit regression on σ2it, the residual êit, the exogenous covariates Wit, and their means (to
accout for individual ﬁxed eﬀects in the risky share equation). While the estimate is noisier due to
the addition of many covariates, the size of the coeﬃcient estimate is very similar, conﬁrming the
general pattern of results.
The fact that the IVFE, IVC, IVTC and 2IVTC estimates are of the same order of magnitude
while the FE estimate is an order of magnitude less, suggests that the biases from ignoring censoring
or unobserved heterogeneity are sizable but comparatively much smaller than the endogeneity bias.
15Since the Tobit model is non-linear while all the other models are linear, the bias induced by omitting ﬁxed
eﬀects is diﬀerent for the IVTC and IVC estimators. Hence, the diﬀerence between the two estimators reﬂects both
censoring and the diﬀerent incidence of ﬁxed eﬀects bias. We assume the latter diﬀerence is small.
16We thank Francis Vella for suggesting this approach.
17In other words, we assume that σ2it = z
′
itθ + mi + εit. Chamberlain (1984) suggests to model the ﬁxed eﬀect mi
as mi = z
′
i0a0 + ... + z
′
iT aT + li. To reduce the computational burden, we assume instead mi = zi
′a + li.
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What is key is accounting for the latter.
6.2 Robustness
In this section we discuss various robustness analyses and extensions.
Instrument validity Our instruments for the workers’ unexplained wage volatility - the variance
of the permanent and transitory component of shocks to ﬁrm growth - may be invalid if the worker
can inﬂuence the outcome of the ﬁrm. This could be the case with the top managers of the ﬁrm
because they exert a dominant role. To account for the possible bias induced by workers with
dominant position inside the ﬁrm we focus on large ﬁrms, where arguably inﬂuence of any worker
on ﬁrm productivity is diluted.
Our instruments may also be invalid if workers concentrate their stock investment in their ﬁrm’s
shares. This would give rise to an omitted variable problem because the portfolio share of risky
asset is inversely related to the variance of risky asset returns (as in classical Merton-type portfolio
choice models), which for investors holding signiﬁcant shares of their ﬁrm may be directly related to
the variance of ﬁrm value added.18 To account for potential instrument invalidity due to ”own-ﬁrm
bias” in household portfolio, we drop individuals with any holdings in their own ﬁrm.19
A ﬁnal concern is that for a family what matters is the variation in total household earnings,
rather than that of the primary earner. Indeed, within-family insurance (for example through
added worker eﬀects) may invalidate the use of the primary earner’s wage volatility as a measure
of background risk. To address this issue, we construct a measure of volatility based on household
earnings (while continuing to use the same set of instruments as in the baseline regression - which
refer to the primary earner).
Results for these various robustness checks are shown in Tables 5 and 6. In both tables the
ﬁrst column reproduces the baseline IV estimate of Table 3, third column. In Table 5 we report
regressions when we retain only ”large” ﬁrms (size above the 25th percentile of the distribution
in the second column and above the median size in the third column, respectively). As can be
seen, these exclusions - if anything- strengthen the estimated marginal eﬀect of background risk
18Døskeland and Hvide (2011) ﬁnd that among Norwegian direct stockholders, 20% of the stock portfolio is held
in shares of current or previous (last 10 years) employers.
19The results are also robust to, instead of dropping individuals with holdings in their employers ﬁrm, redeﬁning
the risky portfolio to include only stocks in ﬁrms other than their own (i.e., the share of risky assets is redeﬁned as
S
′
it =
R′it
R′it+RFit
, with R′ being risky assets net of the value of own-ﬁrm stocks).
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and leave our qualitative conclusions unchanged.
In Table 6, we drop workers who have some assets invested in their own ﬁrm (second column)
and redeﬁne volatility to be the variance of household earnings (third column).20 The results are
again qualitatively unaﬀected. In the latter case, instruments are naturally less powerful but still
pass conventional acceptability thresholds.
6.2.1 Heterogeneity
The eﬀect of background risk on the demand for risky assets should be less important for households
that have greater access to self-insurance (through accumulated assets). Similarly, pass-through
coeﬃcients of ﬁrm risk onto wages should be larger for wealthier individuals, as they are more
willing to bear risk coming from the ﬁrm side due to their presumably higher risk tolerance.
These response heterogeneity predictions can be easily tested using interactions with household
wealth. The results are reported in Table 7. In the top panel we report pass-through estimates.
The ﬁrst two columns replicate the estimates of the model of Table 2 using our sample (instead of
the universe of private sector workers). Ignoring interactions with wealth, pass-through estimates
are reassuringly very similar to those reported in Table 2. The last two columns show pass-through
estimates when permanent and transitory ﬁrm shocks are interacted with wealth. As expected,
ﬁrms oﬀer less insurance to workers with higher wealth (and presumably higher risk tolerance or
access to self-insurance), particularly against permanent shocks (the interaction with transitory
shocks is not statistically signiﬁcant).
In Panel B, we augment our baseline risky portfolio share regressions by interacting the variance
of the worker’s wages with lagged log ﬁnancial wealth (and using as additional instruments the
interaction of the latter with the ﬁrm’s transitory and permanent shocks). We ﬁnd again intuitive
results: the marginal eﬀect of background risk on the demand for risky assets declines with the
level of ﬁnancial wealth.21
20Household earnings volatility is obtained using the same methodology described in Section 5.1 (i.e., the variance
of the residual of a regression of household earnings on observables).
21These results can also be used to address the criticism that our estimate of the marginal eﬀect of background
risk is high due to local (LATE) eﬀects (Angrist and Imbens, 1994). It is well known that in the presence of response
heterogeneity the IV estimator estimates (under some assumptions) not the ”average treatment eﬀect” (in our case,
the average decline in the share of risky assets in portfolio that follows an increase in background risk), but a
”local average treatment eﬀect”, which may be interpreted as the average treatment eﬀect for the individuals who
are mostly aﬀected by a change in the instrument (i.e., the ﬁrm-related risk). For the LATE interpretation to be
responsible for the high value of our baseline estimate, we need the coeﬃcient of the interaction in the pass-through
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Figure 3 plots the pass-through eﬀect (the dotted line on the left-hand scale, obtained considering
permanent ﬁrm shocks only) and the marginal eﬀect of background risk on the portfolio share for
households (the continuous line on the right-hand scale) at diﬀerent points of the distribution of
wealth. Pass-through is always positive and it varies between 0.05 and 0.1 as wealth moves from
the bottom to the top percentile.
The marginal eﬀect of background risk on portfolio allocation is negative at all levels of wealth.
However, while at the bottom of the distribution is large (around -1 or less), it drops around -0.5
around the median and is very close to zero at the top - consistent with the prediction of a self-
insurance model. As we discuss in the next session, this wealth-induced heterogeneity in workers’
insulation from ﬁrms shocks and in response to background risk translates in heterogeneity in the
relevance of background risk. Furthermore, since total wealth and even more so the holdings of
risky assets are heavily concentrated, the eﬀect of background risk on the aggregate demand for
risky assets is likely small - a calculation we perform formally in the next Section.
7 Quantifying the eﬀects of background risk
The quantitative assessment of the importance of background risk hinges on two ingredients.
The ﬁrst ingredient is the size of λ, the marginal eﬀect of a unit increase in background risk
arising from on-the-job wage variation. From the results reported in Table 4, λ ≥ −0.5. We will
perform calculations using the (absolute value) upper bound λ = −0.5. If the eﬀect of background
risk is small using this upper bound, it is a fortiori even smaller if we consider lower estimates of
λ in absolute value.
The second ingredient is the size of overall background risk. Gauging the latter is more prob-
lematic. We cannot use the size of unobserved wage variance precisely because of the argument
that not all variation is risk. However, we can bypass this problem because we can identify the
regressions to be of opposite sign to the coeﬃcient of the interaction in the share regressions (those mostly aﬀected
by the change in the instruments, i.e., those with a larger pass-through coeﬃcient, should be the ones with the larger
sensitivity of background risk to the demand for risky assets). However, we ﬁnd exactly the opposite, suggesting
that LATE is unlikely to be an issue. In unreported regressions we generalize this exercise by allowing the partial
insurance coeﬃcients to vary with a whole vector of observable individual and ﬁrm characteristics: length and type of
education, wealth, ﬁrm size, age, gender. And the same we do for the portfolio share equation. Though we ﬁnd that
some of these variables (namely schooling, wealth and ﬁrm size) are signiﬁcant shifters of the pass-though and/or of
the eﬀect of background risk on the share of risky assets in portfolio, we do not ﬁnd anything systematic that would
make us conclude that a LATE interpretation is justiﬁed.
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sources of background risk and, by varying them, we can provide bounds of its overall eﬀect on the
portfolio share.
Background risk is deﬁned as:
Bit = θ2vVit + θ
2
fFit
For given values of estimated Fit and Vit - the variance of the ﬁrm’s value added growth and
the variance of the worker’s earnings growth, respectively - its size depends on θv, the extent of
worker-speciﬁc variation that is due to risk rather than choice, and the pass-through of ﬁrms shocks
to wages θf . To assess the importance of background risk we do two exercises. First, we compute
the contribution of current estimated background risk to the portfolio share as:
λ̂B̂it = λ̂
(
θ̂2vV̂it + θ̂
2
f F̂it
)
Second, we estimate the eﬀect on the risky portfolio share of changing background risk from
this estimated baseline by varying workers exposure to ﬁrm speciﬁc risk θf or increasing the share
of worker-speciﬁc wage variation that is risk, θv :
λ̂ΔBit = λ̂
(
(θ2v − θ̂2v)V̂it + (θ2f − θ̂2f )F̂it
)
This computation assesses the economic importance of background risk by ”shocking” the two
parameters that capture workers’ exposure to risk, one through institutions or extent of superior
information workers may have about evolution of their wages, θv; the other through ﬁrm-provided
insurance, θf . This exercise is of interest because, as shown by Lemieux et al. (2009) and Benabou
and Tirole (2015), there is strong evidence of a rise of pay for performance wage schemes and
high-powered incentives over the past decade, not only among workers in top positions but also
among low rank employees.22 And competitive pressure for talent could make incentives even more
powered in the future.
To perform these calculations we take the pass-through coeﬃcient with respect to permanent
ﬁrm shocks, θ̂f = 0.07 (because the response to transitory shocks is tiny, and hence adding it
would make little diﬀerence). We quantify the baseline share of worker-speciﬁc wage variation that
22Lemieux et al. (2009) show that in the US between the 1970’s and the 1990’s, the fraction of workers paid based
on the basis of performance rose from 38% to 45%, and for salaried workers from 45% to 60%. This pattern is not
conﬁned to the US. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), for instance, document that the fraction of UK establishments
using some form of performance pay rose from 41% in 1984 to 55% in 2004.
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is risk as follows: under the assumption that censoring bias is unimportant and insurance within
the ﬁrm is substantial (both backed by the estimates in Table 2 and the evidence in Table 4)
p lim λ̂FE ≈ ρvp lim λ̂IV FE . Hence, θ̂v ≈ 0.2. Finally, we estimate Fit and Vit using the variance
of the ﬁrm’s value added growth and the variance of the worker’s earnings growth, respectively
(F̂it = 0.16 and V̂it = 0.053, from Table 1).23
The surface we plot in Figure 4 is the economic eﬀect of background risk on the share of risky
assets in portfolio, computed as:
λ̂
(
θ2vV̂it + θ
2
f F̂it
)
where we use the baseline estimate λ̂ = −0.5. The crossing between the two darker lines on the
surface marks the sample estimates combination (θ̂v, θ̂f ).
Evaluated at the average values of Vit and Fit and at the point estimates of the parameters
(λ̂,θ̂v, θ̂f ) the economic eﬀect of background risk is tiny: the predicted decline in the share of risky
assets is -0.14 percentage points. However, if workers were to share equally the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk
(θf = 0.5), for given θv, the eﬀect would be as high as 2 percentage points (or 10 percent of the
average share of risky assets in portfolio). In contrast, holding constant θf , increasing the amount
of worker-speciﬁc variation that is due to risk, rather than choice, leaves the eﬀect of background
risk on the demand for stocks fairly small. Indeed, even if half of the worker-speciﬁc wage variation
was risk, the eﬀect of background risk would remain small: a predicted 0.7 percentage point decline.
This is visible from the slope of the surface, which is steeper when we move along the θf -axis than
when we move along the θv-axis.
We have documented substantial wealth-induced heterogeneity in pass-through of ﬁrm-related
shocks onto wages as well as in the sensitivity of the demand for stocks to background risk. Con-
sequently, we should expect substantial heterogeneity in the economic eﬀect of background risk.
To illustrate, we consider the eﬀect for households at the 5th and 95th percentile of the wealth
distribution. The estimates of λ̂ are, respectively, -0.97 and -0.097. The other important element
that varies is the pass-through coeﬃcient, which takes values 0.06 and 0.10, respectively for the
5th and 95th percentile of the wealth distribution. Evaluated at the average values of Vit and Fit
and at the point estimates of the parameters θ̂v, θ̂f , the economic eﬀect of background risk are still
small in both groups (-0.23 percentage points at the 5th wealth percentile and -0.06 percentage
points at the 95th percentile). Figure 5 reports the corresponding background risk eﬀect surfaces
23In fact, an estimate of Vit should subtract, from the variance of wage growth, the contribution of the ﬁrm
component - which is however tiny given the extent of insurance within the ﬁrm.
31
for the two groups.
For the wealthy, neither variations in θf nor θv would aﬀect their background risk response
much. The response surface is fundamentally ﬂat. In contrast, the slope of the surface among the
poor is much steeper; a reduction in ﬁrm insurance could potentially have large impact on their
portfolio choice, reducing even further the amounts of wealth held in risky instruments. For these
workers, sharing half of the shocks to their ﬁrms would lower the portfolio share in risky assets by
about 15 percentage points, a very large drop. Also an increase in wage risk unrelated to the ﬁrm’s
fortunes could have a substantial impact. However, because these workers own a small fraction of
total stocks, these larger eﬀects are unlikely to generate large aggregate consequences (which we
document next).
As our last exercise we look at the eﬀect of background risk for the aggregate demand for stocks
in the baseline and in the hypothetical scenarios in which we vary the extent of background risk
faced by individuals. We allow for wealth-related heterogeneity in both the pass-through of ﬁrms
shocks and the portfolio sensitivity to background risk. This exercise is relevant for understanding
the role of background risk for assets prices.
To perform this exercise, we consider an increase in θf and θv from their point estimate to 0.5,
so that workers share 50% of the permanent shocks to their ﬁrm and 50% of their personal wage
variation is risk. For a given worker i with initial wealth Ait−1 the eﬀect on the risky share of rasing
θf and θv from (θ̂v, θ̂f ) to (0.5, 0.5) is:
ΔSi = (λ̂(Ait−1)
(
0.25V̂it + 0.25F̂it
)
− λ̂(Ait−1)
(
θ̂
2
vV̂it + (θ̂f (Ait−1))
2F̂it
)
and that on the individual demand for stocks:
Change in demand for stocks=Ait−1ΔSit
Accordingly, our estimate of the eﬀect on the aggregate demand for stocks is
% change in aggregate demand for stocks=(
∑
i
Ait−1ΔSit)/(Total stockst-1)
We estimate this eﬀect to be 0.2% on average over all sample years - a tiny response to a large
change in background risk. Increasing the size of the shock by setting θf and θv to 0.8 leaves the
result qualitatively unchanged. The reason why the the aggregate demand for stocks is insensitive
to background risk is that the eﬀect of background risk is small at high wealth levels, and the
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ownership of risky assets in concentrated precisely among the wealthy. In fact, we calculate that
among the households with below median wealth increasing θf and θv to 0.5 lowers the demand for
risky assets by 2.8% while it has a negligible eﬀect among households with above median wealth.
Overall, the calculations in this section imply that background risk is economically important
for individuals with low assets; for those who can count on a suﬃciently high level of buﬀer savings
the tempering eﬀect of background risk is contained. The combination of very high sensitivity
among the poor, low sensitivity among the wealthy and the concentration of risky assets in the
hands of the latter implies a small eﬀect of even large increases in background risk on the aggregate
demand for risky assets, suggesting a small role of background risk as a driver of asset prices.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have reassessed the importance of human capital uninsurable risk as an explanation
for agents’ reluctance to invest in stocks. Even though in principle human capital risk can be an
extremely important source of background risk and thus a fundamental factor for understanding
portfolio choices and asset pricing (as long noticed in the literature), its role has been greatly
diminished because empirically its eﬀects on portfolio allocation has been found to be too small
to matter. Our results suggest that it is too early to dismiss background risk as unimportant.
We argue that the available evidence suﬀers from an identiﬁcation problem that greatly biases the
eﬀect of background risk towards zero. We argue that achieving identiﬁcation poses important
conceptual challenges and formidable data requirements.
Using extremely rich Norwegian administrative data, which minimize measurement error in
portfolio composition and wages, we estimate ﬁrm-related measures of workers earnings variation
to isolate exogenous changes in background risk. We show that once the endogeneity of usual
measures of earnings risk is properly addressed and unobserved heterogeneity and censoring of stock
investments are accounted for, the estimated sensitivity of the risky portfolio share to earnings risk
can be up to 25 times larger than the estimates obtained ignoring these issues. While sensitivity
to background wage risk is very large, we ﬁnd small sensitivity to employment (ﬁrm closure) risk.
Can background risk explain the large amount of heterogeneity in portfolio choice observed in
data? Answering this question requires a consistent estimate of the marginal eﬀect of background
risk, which we have, and a comprehensive measure of the size of background risk. At sample
means and for the median wealth household the contribution of background risk is small. But,
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because marginal responses diﬀer considerably depending on the buﬀers accumulated, the economic
importance of background risk varies greatly: it is large for the poor and negligible for the wealthy.
In this sense, background risk is a viable explanation of portfolio heterogeneity among low wealth
people but not among the high wealth segment.
In this paper we have focused on one source of background risk - human capital. Given the large
weight that human wealth has in the lifetime resources of most individuals, this is probably the most
important source of background risk. But it is not the only one. For homeowners, unanticipated
shocks to housing wealth is another, and given the illiquidity of housing it cannot easily be avoided;
for entrepreneurs, private business wealth, is still another - and has been studied by Heaton and
Lucas (2000a, 2000b). These three sources of background risk share one common feature: each one
accounts for a substantial share of a consumer lifetime resources. Thus, even if the eﬀect of each one
may be relatively contained, their joint eﬀect on households assets allocation may be substantial.
We have contributed to quantify one of them. More work is needed to quantify the others.24
24Palia et al. (2014) study the eﬀect of volatility in returns to human capital, housing and private equity on the
risky portfolio share. Unfortunately their study suﬀers from the endogeneity issues that we have stressed in this study
(as it assumes that all measured variation in labor income, housing and private equity returns is background risk).
Calibration exercises show the potential importance of housing return risk for the composition of the ﬁnancial portfolio
(Cocco, 2005) and of returns to private wealth (Heaton and Lucas, 2000b). But a proper empirical assessment of
these sources is still missing and faces the same identiﬁcation problems as those faced by human capital risk.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data sets
The analysis uses several data sources maintained by Statistics Norway that can be combined
through unique personal and household identiﬁers over time.
The Central Population Register
The Central Population register contains end of year information on all Norwegian residents for the
time period 1993-2011 and contains individual demographic information (ie. gender, day of birth,
county of residence and marital status). It also contains family identiﬁers allowing us to match
spouses and cohabiting couples with common children. Identifying un-married couples without
common children is not possible in our sample period.
Administrative Tax and Income Records
Because households in Norway are subject to a wealth tax, they are every year required to report
their complete income and wealth holdings to the tax authority, and the data are available every year
from 1993 to 2011. Each year, before taxes are ﬁled in April (for the previous year), employers,
banks, brokers, insurance companies and any other ﬁnancial intermediaries are obliged to send
both to the individual and to the tax authority, information on the value of the asset owned by
the individual and administered by the employer or the intermediary, as well as information on the
income earned on these assets. In case an individual holds no stocks, the tax authority pre-ﬁlls a
tax form and sends it to the individual for approval; if the individual does not respond, the tax
authority considers the information it has gathered as approved. In 2011, as many as 2,4 million
individuals in Norway (66% of the tax payers) belonged to this category.25 If the individual or
household owns stocks then he has to ﬁll in the tax statement - including calculations of capital
gains/losses and deduction claims. The statement is sent back to the tax authority, which, as in
the previous case receives all the basic information from employers and intermediaries and can thus
check its truthfulness and correctness. Stockholders are treated diﬀerently because the government
wants to save on the time necessary to ﬁll in more complex tax statements and to reduce the risk
of litigation due to miscalculated deductions on capital losses and taxes on capital gains. Traded
ﬁnancial assets are reported at market value. For stocks in non-listed companies that are not traded
25See the 2011 Annual Report from the Norwegian Tax Administration, http://www.skatteetaten.no/en/.
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the company itself has to provide a tax report to the tax registry every year. In this report the
company proposes a value of the company by the end of the year. This value should be the total net
worth of the company, after deducting any debts. All assets have to be included in the valuation,
expect goodwill which is not included. The tax authority may adjust the value of the company
upwards after going over the report, if it does not ﬁnd the proposed value reasonable. Obviously
this leads to undervaluation of the companies, but this is bound as unrealistically low ﬁgures would
cause the tax authority to start a more thorough investigation.
This procedure, particularly the fact that ﬁnancial institutions supply information on their
customers’ ﬁnancial assets directly to the tax authority, makes tax evasion very diﬃcult, and thus
non-reporting or under-reporting of assets holdings are likely to be negligible.
The Norwegian National Educational Database
Educational attainment is reported by the educational establishment directly to Statistics Norway
at the individual level, hence minimizing the measurement error. The information includes on every
student the highest level of education) at the individual level as of October every year.
The Register of Shareholders
The register consists of all Norwegian limited liability companies. Importantly the register contains
information about shareholders and received dividends. Dividends are reported at the yearly level,
and ownership is reported as of December 31st each year.
Employer-Employee Register
All ﬁrms hiring workers in Norway are required to report all work relationships to the Central
Employer-Employee register. This includes registering the date and individual ID for the each
time an employment relationship is established or terminated and when permanent changes are
made to the registered information about working hours, job title (occupation code) and workplace
(department). The register also contains the organization number of the ﬁrm and the sum of
total payments (wages and remuneration) from the ﬁrm to the worker at a yearly level. When a
worker has work relationships with several ﬁrms during the year, we select the ﬁrm with the highest
payments to the worker that year as the main work-relationship.
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The Central Register of Establishments and Enterprises
The register contains all enterprises and establishments in the private and public sector in Norway.
For our purposes we select information on organization ID, geographical information, institutional
sector, industrial classiﬁcation (NACE), number of employees.
Firm Balance Sheet register
Contains accounts and balance sheet information from the ﬁnancial statements of all non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrm. We extract all variables needed to calculate value added per worker. Some of the main
variables and deﬁnitions:
Operating income and operating expenses are ordinary income and expenses outside ﬁnancial
ones. Operating income is divided into sales revenues (taxable and tax-free), rental income, commis-
sion revenues, proﬁts from the sale of ﬁxed assets and other operating-related revenues. Operating
expenses include changes in stocks, costs of raw materials and consumables used, wages and salaries,
depreciation and write-downs of tangible ﬁxed assets and intangible ﬁxed assets as well as a number
of diﬀerent types of other operating expenses. Examples of operating expenses that are speciﬁed
are subcontracting, repair and maintenance and expenses relating to means of transport.
Cost of raw materials and consumables used includes stock changes of work in progress and
ﬁnished goods.
Wages and salaries include wages, holiday pay, employers’ national insurance premium, pension
costs and other personnel expenses.
Financial income and ﬁnancial expenses are ordinary revenues and expenses relating to invest-
ments, securities, receivables and liabilities. The ﬁnancial items also include share of earnings
relating to foreign exchange gains and losses (agio) and value changes of market-based current
asset investments.
Extraordinary revenues and expenses apply to material items that are unusual for the business
and do not occur regularly.
Taxes represent taxes relating to the accounting result, and consist of taxes payable, expected
reimbursement claims from owners and changes in deferred taxes. Taxes payable are the taxes ex-
pected to be assessed on the year’s taxable income corrected for any discrepancy between calculated
and assessed taxes the year before.
Allocation of the proﬁt/loss for the year shows how a proﬁt is allocated and losses are covered.
It provides information on transfers to/from equity and dividends to owners.
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Fixed assets cover assets that are mainly included in the enterprise’s long-term creation of value
and are intended for permanent ownership or use, as well as receivables and securities scheduled
for repayment later than one year after the time of settlement. This includes tangible ﬁxed assets
broken down into buildings and facilities, facilities under construction, transport equipment, ma-
chinery etc. Long-term receivables and investments are included as ﬁxed assets, such as investments
in other activities and loans to enterprises in the same group.
Current assets are assets relating to the enterprise’s sales of goods and services, or which are
expected to have a functional period of less than one year in operation. This includes cash and
short-term capital investments (cash, bank deposits, shares, bonds etc.), receivables and inventories.
Receivables are current assets if it has been agreed or scheduled that they shall be repaid within
one year after the end of the ﬁnancial year.
Equity is the portion of the total capital belonging to the owners, and is shown as the value
of assets less liabilities. Equity is classiﬁed in two main divisions, invested equity and retained
earnings. Invested equity consists of share capital and share premium accounts. Retained earnings
consist of fund for assessment diﬀerences and other reserves/uncovered losses.
Liabilities cover all obligations that can come to place restrictions on the future use of the enter-
prise’s resources, and are divided into provisions for liabilities and charges (pension commitments,
deferred tax liabilities, etc., other long-term liabilities and short-term liabilities. Long-term lia-
bilities are legal or ﬁnancial obligations not meant to be redeemed during the coming accounting
period, and are not related to the enterprise’s short-term sales of goods and services. Short-term
liabilities are liabilities that fall due for payment within one year from the time of settlement, or
are directly related to the enterprise’s short-term sales of goods and services.
Register of Bankruptcies
The register contains the ﬁrm number and the exact date of bankruptcy at the ﬁrm level. All
juridical objects, which includes all types of ﬁrms/enterprises and individuals who have unpaid
accounts and are by deﬁnition insolvent, can be declared bankrupt.
A.2 Sample Selection
We start with a data set on income recipients that merges record from the Central Population
Register and the Administrative Tax and Income Register. This merged data set includes 29,814,364
person-year observations for the period 1995 to 2010. Given that we need to use as an instrument
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a measure of ﬁrm-level risk, we focus on a sample of individuals who are continuously employed
in the private sector (sector 710 or 717). This excludes those who are not working (unemployed,
retired, disabled, etc.) and those who have a spell in the government sector. This sample selection
leaves us with 9,888,562 observations. Next, we exclude individuals who are younger than 25 (and
hence possibly still in school) and those older than 60 (who may have intermittent participation,
and also have widespread access to early retirement, typically from the age of 62, see e.g., Vestad
2014). We are left with 7,566,412 observations. Merging this data set with ﬁrm-level information
reduces the usable sample to 6,501,730 observations (this sample reduction is due to some missing
information in the ﬁrm data set used to construct the measure of ﬁrm value added, exclusion of
short lived ﬁrms -those that are active for less than 3 years- and some inconsistencies in the reported
ﬁrm number in the Employer/Employee registry vs. the Balance sheet registry). Next, we exclude
individuals who have earnings below the basic amount threshold of the Norwegian Social Insurance
Scheme (grunnbelopet) in one or more years and are left with 5,168,462 observations. Even though
we restrict the sample of workers between 25 and 60 years of age, some students are still left in the
sample, and will typically have low incomes.26 Further, workers who have some period of disability
of sick leave, will often have less than full-time positions, potentially in several ﬁrms. To reduce
the impact of such outliers, we drop all the observations where earnings growth is less than -80%
or more than 500% (and are left with 5,115,196 observations). Since we run regressions at the
household level, we keep only the primary earner of the household (4,846,766 observations left).
The number of observations in the various regressions we run are less than this because we use lags
for constructing some of the variables and instruments.
26The incentive to stay below this threshold is signiﬁcant as the government stipend to all students is reduced
almost one-to-one for each dollar earned above a threshold only marginally higher than grunnbelopet.
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